Seminar Series

Fall 2024

David Alonzo

When: Tuesday,10/15/24 Time: 11:45-1pm
Where: WebEx
Title of the Presentation: “Marrying Your Job: Matching and Mobility with Geographic Heterogeneity”

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of geographic heterogeneity in occupational returns on marriage market outcomes and the impact of family formation on the geographic distribution of labor. I document that workers living in cities that pay relatively lower wages to their occupation (i.e., workers who have higher potential pecuniary returns from migration) are less likely to marry and more likely to divorce. Using a structural model of migration and family formation, I assess individual and aggregate effects of marriage and location choices through counterfactual experiments. I find that, overall, the marriage-market amenity enhances productivity by drawing workers to high-return locations.

More Info: https://davidealonzo.github.io/index.html

Bernard Ganglmair

When: Monday, 9/30/24 Time: 11:45-1pm
Where: In-Person
Title of the Presentation: “Regulatory Compliance with Limited Enforceability: Evidence from Privacy Policies”

Abstract: We study how asymmetric enforceability of regulatory rules affects firms’ compliance using a simple inspection model and a large sample of German privacy policies. We exploit the introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation, compelling firms to disclose, in accessible language, details of their data use. The specifics of disclosure are objective, whereas readability is subjective and difficult to enforce. We show that firms increased disclosure, but the policy readability did not improve. In line with theory, firms anticipating regulatory scrutiny and those facing higher-budget data protection authorities demonstrated a stronger response in readability compliance without sizeable effects on disclosure.

More Info: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4600876

Marco Errico

When: Tuesday, 9/17/24 Time: 11:45-1pm
Where: WebEx
Title of the Presentation: “Oligopolies in Trade and Transportation: Implications for the Gains from Trade”

Abstract: Transportation services are crucial for goods to move globally; however, given the concentration in the industry, and its interaction with granular importers, the realized gains from trade differ from standard theories. We study the interplay between oligopoly in the transportation industry and oligopsony power retained by non-atomistic importers. We leverage transaction-level data from Chilean customs to document several empirical facts: (i) market concentration in the transportation sector and among importers, and (ii) that transportation prices are highly dispersed and are the outcome of bilateral negotiations. We then develop a trade model that departs from the usual iceberg cost assumption and allows for bargaining with two-sided market power in the transportation industry. We find that transport carriers charge large markups (on average 2), but importers benefit from substantial bargaining power (markdown of 0.85 and Nash bargaining 2.5 times larger). Finally, we embed the bilateral bargaining framework into a quantitative trade model of importing. We show that market concentration reduces the pass-through of tariff shocks to gains from trade, and that the welfare implications of trade liberalization are different when accounting for the strategic interaction between the transportation sector and importers.

More Info: https://www.marcoerrico.net/

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