“Not A Game Changer”

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October 17, 2011

Abstract

Surveys of patrons of the 2011 Baltimore Grand Prix provide evidence of the economic impact of the event that is vastly smaller than the projections by the events promoter, Baltimore Racing Development. Our best estimate of the gross spending impact of the event is about $25 million, while the promoter projected impact of $70 million. About 76% of the patrons in our sample came from Maryland, and about 64% of them from the Baltimore metropolitan area. Consequently, about $10 million of the spending we found would likely have occurred in Baltimore or Maryland even without the event. Based on our survey information, the Baltimore Grand Prix was certainly not a game changer.

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² The authors wish to acknowledge University of Maryland graduate students Sam Bernstein, Jake Bustad, and Amber Wiest for their participation in this project.
For more than 40 years, Baltimore has been recognized as an innovator in economic redevelopment with its creation of a downtown, visitor-oriented infrastructure (Levine, 1987; Norris, 2003). Attractions such as Harborplace and the Camden Yards Sports Complex have helped transform Baltimore’s formerly-industrial Inner Harbor into a vibrant center for recreation, shopping and entertainment that annually attracts millions of visitors (Hula, 1990; Levine, 1999; Wagner, 1996). This strategy has been one of Baltimore’s primary responses to the trends of disinvestment, deindustrialization, and depopulation that have challenged U.S. cities since the 1950s (Harvey, 2001a, 2001b). Within this effort, public and private investments of more than $2 billion in the Inner Harbor have helped to develop a tourist industry employing 26,000 people (Sage Policy Group, 2011). These investments have not forestalled Baltimore’s decline, as the city’s population fell by 30,000 to 620,000 between 2000 and 2010, and the city has 11.1% unemployment and poverty rates exceeding 21% (Civilian Labor Force, Employment & Unemployment by Place of Residence, 2011; US Census Bureau, 2011b).

Towards addressing these issues, the city recently hosted an Indy Racing League event, the Baltimore Grand Prix (BGP). According to Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake, the race and its three-day “festival of speed” would be a “game changer” for the city, which race organizers estimated would produce an economic impact of $70 million and provide positive media exposure to millions in a global television audience ("Economic Impact Report: Baltimore Grand Prix," 2010; Scharper, 2010). This report examines the race’s economic impact, based on surveys collected from race attendees. Our best estimate is that total spending by patrons of the event was about $25 million, if attendance reached 160,000 (as reported in the media), and was about $16 million if attendance was 100,000 (as initially projected in the economic impact report). Of course, not all of that is net new spending in Baltimore or Maryland; if we count only
spending by attendees from outside Maryland, the total of net new spending ranges between $6.8 and $10.8 million. While these findings indicate an impact that falls well short of the race organizer’s projections, we suggest that they are consistent with results from similar events and the historical experience of tourist-oriented economic development in Baltimore. It is to these we now turn.

**Research on Public Investment in Sport**

Over the past 20 years, the public sector has invested more than $10 billion to subsidize the construction of stadiums and arenas throughout North America ("Sports Facilities Reports," 2008). Sporting events, such as the Olympics and FIFA World Cup, often require billions of public investment in athletic facilities that have limited utility and value beyond the competition. These investments have been justified by the belief that events and facilities would produce substantial economic activity, create quality jobs, anchor economic redevelopment, and allow the city (or nation) to project a vibrant image of the city to local, national and global media audiences (DeMause & Cagan, 2008; Rosentraub, 1999). However, independent economic analyses have rejected these rationales by finding little economic growth or job creation attributable to facilities and events (Baade & Dye, 1988; Baade & Sanderson, 1997; Noll & Zimbalist, 1997). In terms of redevelopment, substitution effect explains most of the economic activity related to facilities (Chapin, 2004), while little evidence directly links sporting events with travel or investment decisions (Whitson & Macintosh, 1993, 1996).

While research has tended to focus on the impacts of facilities and mega-events such as the Olympics, studies of automobile races, including Formula 1 and Grand Prix events, are common in the literature. Considering just Grand Prix-type races, McCartney (2005) studied the Macao Grand Prix, Chen (2008) cites Quinonez (2008) on the Bahrain Grand Prix; Henderson, et
al. (2010) discuss the Singapore Grand Prix; and Bessit (2006) addressed a possible South Africa Grand Prix. Perhaps the most widely studied event is the Melbourne Grand Prix, researched by Gamage (1997), Applied Economics (2006) for the State of Victoria, and Dwyer and Forsyth (2009). In Gamage’s prospective study, he identified increases in household income between AU$18 million to AU$20 million. In Dwyer and Forsyth’s (2009) analysis of economic impact methodologies, they find that traditional cost-benefit analysis found a net loss of AU$6.7 million, while a general equilibrium analysis indicated an increase in the Gross State Product of over AU$62 million, but it came at the expense of a reduction in the GSP of the other Australian states of AU$60.5 million. The net impact of the Melbourne Grand Prix is, therefore, only AU$1.9 million, barely noticeable in Australian Gross Domestic Product.

Given these results, Baltimore’s experience is certainly not extraordinary. However, Baltimore’s unique position regarding tourism-related and sport-oriented development suggests the city had an inflated set of expectations, which have seemingly been met in the past although research has suggested otherwise.

**Baltimore’s Renaissance**

Cultural geographer David Harvey (2001b) has described Baltimore as “emblematic of the processes that have moulded cities under US capitalism, offering a laboratory sample of contemporary urbanism” (p. 7). Suburbanization reduced Baltimore’s population by 1/3 since 1950 as the surrounding county’s population almost tripled (US Census Bureau, 2011a). Due to deindustrialization, the city’s manufacturing employment declined by 85% since 1970 (Vicino, 2008). Together, suburbanization and deindustrialization have trapped Baltimore in a cycle of disinvestment, in which the narrowing of the city’s tax base has forced a reduction in the quality
of public services and served as the impetus for further relocation and disinvestment (Friedman, Andrews, & Silk, 2004).

Baltimore sought to interrupt and reverse this cycle through a downtown-focused, entrepreneurial approach that attempted to attract capital from increasingly-mobile businesses and visitors (Harvey, 2001a). Starting in the 1950s, projects such as the Charles Center, Harborplace, National Aquarium, and Baltimore Convention Center received direct public investments or tax abatements (Levine, 1987). By the early 1980s, these attractions brought as many as 18 million visitors annually into the city, which led to media proclamations that Baltimore was experiencing a renaissance (Hula, 1990; Levine, 1987). Despite appearances, the benefits from this development were mainly confined to the Inner Harbor and surrounding neighborhoods and did not substantively reverse the Baltimore’s overall decline. Instead, Szanton (1986) stated these improvements masked the city’s “rot beneath the glitter.”

The development of the $336 million Camden Yards Sports Complex provided a similar appearance of success in distinction to underlying realities (Friedman et al., 2004). Opened in 1992 as the first MLB stadium to feature a retro-design, Oriole Park at Camden Yards was considered an immediate success with national acclaim and a 50% increase in Orioles attendance (Hamilton & Kahn, 1997). However, despite the positive media attention, increased attendance and tourism, Hamilton and Kahn (1997) found a net public loss of $11 million annually from the baseball stadium, while also suggesting that the football stadium would produce an annual public deficit of between $14 million and $18 million. Further questioning the value of the stadiums, Chapin (2004) found little evidence to support the assertion that the stadiums served to catalyze further redevelopment on the western edge of downtown Baltimore.
The Renaissance Continues?

While the Inner Harbor and the Camden Yards Sports Complex were trendsetters in urban redevelopment, their success encouraged other cities to develop their waterfronts and utilize similar design elements such that Baltimore has been surpassed by many of its competitors for visitors (Friedman et al., 2004; Hannigan, 1998; Levine, 1999). Over the past decade, Harborplace is no longer the attraction it once was as it has aged and Orioles attendance has fallen to its lowest level since 1988, when they played in Memorial Stadium ("Baltimore Orioles Attendance Records by Baseball Almanac," 2006). Towards reversing the malaise in the city’s tourism industry, civic leaders embraced efforts to establish an IRL grand prix race through the city’s core.

In 2008, members of Baltimore Racing Development (BRD) began approaching city leaders about the possibility of holding an Indy Racing League (IRL) event through the Inner Harbor area (Scharper & Fenton, 2011). Slowly building support, BRD received a commitment from Mayor Rawlings-Blake and Maryland Governor Martin O’Malley for the race in May 2010, which included $7.75 million in highway funds to repave streets surrounding the Inner Harbor and $2 million in loans (Scharper & Fenton, 2011). In addition to these commitments, the city’s economic development office and the state’s office of sports marketing offered significant logistical support for the race that would be held during Labor Day weekend, which is traditionally a slow time for tourism in Baltimore.

These commitments were justified on the basis of an economic impact study produced by Baltimore Racing Development (BRD), the race’s organizer ("Economic Impact Report" 2010). According to BRD, the race would produce yearly benefits “[o]ver $70,000,000 into the local economy” which translates into “$119,000,000 with the multiplier effect”. In addition, there will
be “[o]ver $6,000,000 in direct tax revenue” and “400 new full time equivalent jobs”. The event, the report asserts, “will bring over 100,000 visitors to the City of Baltimore,” with 60% of race attendees coming from outside of the region, 20% from within the region but out of Maryland, specifically identifying the District of Columbia, Virginia, or Delaware, and 20% of visitors will be from Maryland. The prospective television audience was estimated to be 3.5 million US viewers and a like-sized viewership outside the United States.

**Results**

During the three days of the Baltimore Grand Prix, students from the University of Maryland, College Park stood near each of the four entrances to the race grounds to survey racegoers before they entered the infield area. Survey takers were stationed at each gate because they had different proximity to large parking structures, Baltimore’s Inner Harbor, public transportation, or downtown hotels. Over the three day period, 210 surveys were completed; 35 on Friday, 105 on Saturday, and 70 on Sunday. The survey instrument is included as Appendix A.

The survey data allows us to address some of the important questions about economic impact of events such as the Baltimore Grand Prix. One important issue is the point of origin of the attendees. A selling point for hosting of mega-events is that visitors will come from many places. The first question in our survey was the respondent’s home zip code. Maryland zip codes range from 20601 to 21930. Of the 210 surveys, only 76 came from respondents whose zip code was outside the Baltimore metropolitan area, which for our purposes incorporates Baltimore City, and Baltimore, Carroll, Harford, Howard, and Anne Arundel counties. Of those 76, 26 were from within the state of Maryland. In other words, the origin of our sample is vastly different from the origin of visitors in the BRD prospectus. Rather than 80% from out of
Maryland as BRD projected, our sample is 76% from Maryland and 64% from the Baltimore metropolitan area.

An event like the Baltimore Grand Prix is touted as one which raises international visibility of the city. Indeed, Formula 1 auto racing is far more prominent internationally than in the United States, so it is plausible that hosting such an event will attract foreign interest. That does not seem to have been the case for the inaugural Baltimore Grand Prix, however. Only three of our respondents, out of 210, reported being from somewhere other than the United States. Indeed, the event did not draw significantly from outside the Mid-Atlantic region of the United States; 25 of the 47 American, but non-Maryland, attendees were from Virginia, West Virginia, Delaware, Pennsylvania, or the District of Columbia. So, while BRD projected 20% from the region, which they limited to Virginia, Delaware and the District of Columbia, we find even for an expanded definition of region that only 12% of visitors were from the region but not from Maryland.

We also asked about people’s commuting to the event and their lodging. Over 70% of the respondents said they would drive back and forth on the day they attended the event or that they lived close enough to essentially have no commute. Only 18 out of 210, 8.6%, said they were staying in a hotel, and 42 (20%) indicated they were staying with friends. BRD projected that 60% of the visitors would stay at least one night using 30,000 hotel rooms at least one night and 58,000 hotel room nights. If attendance was 160,000, and 8.6% stayed in hotels, that is about 13,800 hotel rooms, assuming no doubling up in rooms and based on survey reports that visitors stayed for 2.5 nights, the total number of hotel rooms nights was 34,500, or just less than 60% of the hotel room nights projected by BRD.
An argument made for holding the race in Baltimore over Labor Day weekend was that typically business downtown is very slow at that time with hotel occupancy rates below 70%. Only 52 people offered an answer to the location of their lodgings, 34 of them indicating downtown, 8 saying in the city but not downtown, and 10 reporting the suburbs. Of the fifty respondents that both reported an accommodation type and an accommodation location, only 12 indicated a downtown hotel. These numbers are certainly consistent with press reports that hotel occupancy rates during the Grand Prix were similar to previous Labor Day weekends when there was no Grand Prix (Miller, 2011). As a result, instead of the $7.2 million in economic impact from lodging as stated in the BRD Economic Impact Study, Miller (2011) stated that net hotel revenues increased by just $1.2 million due to higher hotel rates.

The survey also asked respondents about their daily spending at the event. One question was about the rate charged by their hotel and the length of their stay. Our results have already established that there were relatively few hotel stayers among the crowds entering via the four public gates and that very few were from outside Maryland or Baltimore more specifically. Sixteen individuals reported both the nightly rate for their hotel and the number of nights of their stay. The average number of nights in hotels for this group is 2.5 at a nightly rate of $202. The lowest nightly rate was $50, the highest $380.

The survey also asked respondents about other types of spending. Respondents were asked about daily spending on the grounds and outside the grounds. On the grounds spending was split into concessions and merchandise. The average onsite spending was $59. Not everyone reported spending on concessions or merchandise, leaving the question blank. Averaging over only those who did not leave them blank, concessions spending on average is
$46 (185 respondents) and merchandise spending averages $24 (159) respondents. Treating non-responses as zeros, the averages fall to $40 and $18 respectively.

Off site spending includes food and beverages, day and night entertainment, retail, parking, and off site transportation – gas in a car, car rental, shuttle or taxi service. The average for all of these together is $102. Food and beverages average $39; retail spending $13; and transportation and parking about $20 a day. Consistent with reports of little business at downtown attractions during the event, we find that average daytime spending on entertainment is $5, and for nighttime entertainment is $10. If one considers only those respondents that gave explicit responses, as opposed to leaving the values blank, the averages are $9 and $18, respectively.

Taking all the daily spending figures together, including the average nightly hotel rate, the average is $160 if non-reports are treated as zero. If attendance over the three days was 160,000 as suggested by some preliminary reports, then total spending attributed to the event could be about $25 million. The Baltimore Racing Development projections on the economic impact of the event indicated 100,000 visitors to Baltimore for the event. Using that figure for visitors, the total spending is only $16 million. Both figures are far below the Baltimore Grand Prix economic impact report projection of $70 million of benefits into the Baltimore economy. But perhaps treating non-reports as zeros is not appropriate and unfair to the event. If averages are only over those explicitly reporting values, excluding hotels, then the average value of on and off site spending is $193. But that omits hotel spending. The average hotel rate of $202 for the 8% of the survey respondents who stayed in hotels and reported a nightly rate cannot be added to the $193 as that would ascribe hotel spending to the vast number of respondents who did not stay in a hotel. Assigning that same average rate to the small number of people who reported staying
in a hotel but did not state a nightly hotel rate, we add $17 (=$202*.086) to the average daily spending of $193. Therefore, using only values reported, not assigning zeros to non-reports, the average daily spending jumps from $160 to $210. Using the latter, more generous assumptions, the total spending attributed to the event could be as much as $33.6 million, if there are 160,000 visitors, and $21 million if there were only 100,000 as Baltimore Racing Development’s own projections indicated. Again, survey results indicate far less spending than the $70 million first proclaimed as likely benefits to Baltimore from hosting the Grand Prix.

These figures, while far smaller than projected by Baltimore Racing Development, are still likely substantial overestimates of the race’s true impact on the city of Baltimore and the state of Maryland. Since 76% of the attendees are from Maryland, and since few of the Marylanders in our survey report having traveled outside Maryland for Labor Day 2010, it is probable that most of the spending by Marylanders at the Grand Prix otherwise would have occurred in Maryland or Baltimore without the race. In other words, spending by Marylanders at the Grand Prix substituted for spending by Marylanders at other Baltimore and Maryland businesses and attractions. To get a sense of how much the event actually attracted to the city and state, we focus on the 50 survey respondents from outside of Maryland. For that group, total spending related to the Baltimore Grand Prix is about $10.8 million, which we consider to be the gross benefit to Baltimore and Maryland of the 2011 Baltimore Grand Prix.

Spending from this one year may be an inappropriate metric for judging the success of the event. After all, one of the widely proclaimed benefits of this “game changing” event is the way it will alter future tourism to Baltimore. The argument is that the images of the Inner Harbor and local attractions will raise the perception of Baltimore among non-Baltimoreans. With that in mind, we asked people about their views of Baltimore as a tourist destination prior
to the event and the likelihood that they would return to Baltimore within the next two years as a general tourist. 180 respondents gave a rating of Baltimore as a tourist destination, with the average rating of 7.3 out of 10. One may think this a rather high rating of Baltimore as a tourist destination, but if one looks only to respondents from outside Maryland the mean is still 7. Of course, we don’t know how the respondents would rank other destinations, so 7 may not be high.

We also find a positive, and statistically significant, correlation between the ranking of Baltimore as a tourist destination and the likelihood of returning within the next two years as a general tourist among those respondents not from Maryland. However, among those out-of-state visitors who said their primary reason for coming to Baltimore was the Grand Prix, the pre-race ranking of Baltimore as a tourist destination tended to be lower than it was for out-of-staters whose primary reason for being in Baltimore was other than the Grand Prix. For those reporting the Grand Prix as their primary reason for being in Baltimore, the mean rating of Baltimore as a tourist destination is 6.7 (31 observations); for those whose primary reason is something other than the Grand Prix, the rating is 7.5 (16 observations). The difference in the means is not, however, statistically significant.

There is no correlation between the likelihood of returning to Baltimore in the next two years as a general tourist and whether the Grand Prix was or was not the primary reason for this visit. Moreover, whether the full sample or only those from outside of Maryland, the rating of a likely return to Baltimore in the next two years is quite high, about 8.5 in the full sample and 8.1 in the out of state sample. While the difference is not statistically significant, those out-of-staters in Baltimore primarily for the Grand Prix report a slightly smaller likelihood of returning in the next two years.
The final question in our survey asked respondents if their attendance at the Grand Prix affects “your decision to visit Baltimore at some other time this year”. In asking this question our purpose was to get at the possibility that visitors substitute one visit for another. Only 182 of our survey respondents answered this question, with about 36% of them reporting that this trip affected their decision about another visit to Baltimore this year. The answer did not indicate whether the Grand Prix trip replaced some other trip or motivated the respondent to add a trip. However, there is no correlation between responses to this question and the likelihood of returning to Baltimore as a tourist in the next two years; this is true whether one considers the full sample or only those from outside Maryland. We interpret this as very weak support for the idea that the Grand Prix replaced some other trip to Baltimore rather than induced the respondent to add a trip. If adding a trip were the case, one would expect a positive relationship between affecting the decision and the likelihood of returning in the next two years.

On the other hand, there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the responses to this question and whether the Grand Prix was the primary purpose for the trip. In other words, people who said coming to the Grand Prix affected their decision on another trip to Baltimore this year were also more likely to say the race was their primary reason for visiting Baltimore. We don’t know if this affect is to make another trip more or less likely, but we can look to responses to a different question for some evidence on this issue.

Respondents were asked what they did Labor Day weekend in 2010. The most common response was “to stay at home”, the second most common was “to entertain family and friends.” These two responses add to 60% of all answers, both in the full sample and in the sample of Maryland residents. Interestingly, 10% of Maryland residents said they went to a Maryland beach in 2010, suggesting that some of the local visitors to the race came at a cost to other
Maryland attractions. Only about 9.5% of Maryland residents, 15 individuals out of 160, indicated they had left Maryland for Labor Day 2010. Four non-Marylanders, 8% of the out of state visitors, went to Maryland beaches or visited family in Baltimore in 2010, suggesting the race even diverted some out-of-staters from other Maryland destinations. The evidence from our survey is, therefore, that the Baltimore Grand Prix did not generate a large net inflow of visitors to Baltimore and many of those visitors were redirected from other activities in Maryland.

**Conclusions**

Promoters tout events like the Baltimore Grand Prix as catalysts for economic development. Politicians often refer to these events as “game changers” and suggest, as Baltimore Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake did, that “this street race will change the way the world sees Baltimore as a result of global media exposure to millions of Indy Racing League fans who attend similar events in San Paulo, Long Beach and St. Petersburg” Mayor Rawlings-Blake is not alone among state and local politicians who parroted the claims of Baltimore Racing Development as if the figures from the report were objective truth rather than the marketing/lobbying ploy of a group with a great deal to gain from promoting the project. What is worse, they knowingly or unwittingly exaggerated the outlandish claims. For example, on the Mayor’s website one finds the following statement “BRD 5-year Projections show Race will generate 2000 jobs.” The report does claim 400 new full time equivalent jobs as yearly benefits, as already noted above. There is no discussion of how long these jobs will exist or even if they will exist beyond the staging of the event each year. Full time equivalent does have the ring of a year-round job at something like forty hours a week, but that is surely not what is meant. No one

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could possibly believe that a three-day event requires enough work to employ 400 people full-time year round. But suppose one is that gullible or naïve. Why would it require an additional 400 year round, full time employees in the second year? And another 400 in the third year? The point is that creating 400 jobs that last for five years is not the same thing as creating 2000 jobs. The former means 400 people have jobs, the latter means 2000 people have jobs. Both claims for the BGP are wildly optimistic, at the least, but the latter is ridiculous.

Surveys conducted at the event produce objective evidence on what the event really accomplished in terms of hotel stays and spending. By this measure (and corroborated by initial media reports), we find that the claims of the BRD proposal far exceed the reality. The evidence is clear that the benefits in terms of visitors and spending are far smaller than the proponents led politicians and the public to believe.

Neither our survey nor the BRD Economic Impact Report have information on the costs of putting on the event; good public policy decisions must account for both costs and benefits. There are direct costs to the city for which there may be some accounting and compensation from Grand Prix organizers, but, others, such as the value of the time spent on the race by city’s economic development office and the alternative opportunities for the use of public funds, are unlikely to be quantified. Yet, the costs of the race go well beyond the public sector as the losses sustained by local businesses and attractions may never be measured. These costs range from the expenses of those in Little Italy and in Fells Point who spent money on extra staff, food, and licenses in anticipation of customers who never showed up, or the National Aquarium whose clientele were scared to come downtown and not replaced by race-goers, or even the hotels and attractions in Ocean City whose patrons were diverted to Baltimore by the race.
The bottom line is that the Baltimore Grand Prix was not a game changing event. It was just one more example of special pleaders using flimsy, self-interested arguments to convince politicians to do a flashy but ultimately unproductive activity rather than provide mundane but immensely important and beneficial public services.
References


Appendix A: Survey Instrument

1. Your home zip code is: __________

2. How many people are in your immediate travel party? __________

3. Which of the following best describes your commute to Baltimore?
   
   O My travel party stayed overnight in the local area at a local hotel/motel;
   O My travel party stayed overnight in the local area at the home of a family member or friend;
   O My travel party will commute to and from Baltimore on the same day that we attend the Grand Prix;
   O My travel party lives within 30 miles of Baltimore, so we essentially had little/no commute.

4. Which of the following best describes what you did Labor Day Weekend last year?
   
   O Went to the beach in MD    O Visited family in Baltimore    O Entertained family and friends    O Went to the beach out of MD    O Visited family out of Baltimore    O Did not travel or entertain
   O Other ________________

5. a) How many motor sports events do you attend each year?
   __________
   
   b) How many motor sports events do you watch on television per year?
   __________
   
   c) How many sporting events have you attended in Baltimore in the last 12 months?
   __________

6. Which of the following best describes the type of accommodations you had during your stay in the Baltimore area:
7. How much money have you spent (or do you intend to spend) **DAILY** on the following items:

At The Baltimore Grand Prix:
- Concessions $__________
- Merchandise $__________

Off-Site within the Baltimore Area
- Eating and Drinking $__________
- Gasoline/Car $__________
- Retail/Shopping $__________
- Parking $__________
- Daytime Entertainment (e.g. Museums, Tours, Zoo, Golf, etc…) $__________
- Nighttime Entertainment (e.g. Cover Charge/Tickets for Clubs/Bands/Shows/Parties) $__________

8. As it relates to your overnight accommodations, answer the following where applicable:
   a. Nightly Rate: $__________
   b. Number of Nights Stayed: ____________
   c. Accommodations Location: Baltimore - downtown _____; Baltimore - not downtown _____; suburbs ____________

9. Where applicable, estimate money spent on:
   - Airfare/Airline: $__________ / ____________
   - Rental Car: $__________ (daily rate)
   - Taxi/Shuttle: $__________ (daily)

10. Prior to your current trip to Baltimore, please rate on a scale from 1 to 10 (10 being the highest rating) how desirable you view Baltimore as a tourist destination. _________

11. On a scale from 1 to 10 (10 being the highest rating), rate how likely you are to return to Baltimore within the next 2 years as a general tourist? _________

12. Was your **primary reason** for traveling to Baltimore this weekend to attend the Baltimore Grand Prix?
13. Did taking this trip to Baltimore affect your decision to visit Baltimore at some other time this year?

O Yes  O No